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This article explores the convergence between three pillars of inﬂuence – feminist secur-
ity studies, civil society activism and policy decision-making – and its role in the adop-
tion and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325.
It argues that these three pillars, individually and collectively, have made important con-
tributions to the debate and action on the gender and security agenda, but that they
remain organically disconnected. Their convergence has the potential to achieve
path-breaking results in the sphere of gender and security, whilst their divergence
makes transformation unattainable. We show the disconnect in the application of
UNSCR 1325 in Africa and argue that this is partly the reason why, despite enormous
efforts, the gains realised in terms of gender equality in the peace and security arena
have been negligible.
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Introduction
Efforts to redress gender inequality remain conﬁned to the periphery of the international security
agenda, notwithstanding an evident increase in policy intervention and an active civil society,
including academic engagement. Scholarly analysis has continued to offer insights into the
drivers of gender inequality and its manifestations in the international security arena.1 The adoption
of policy frameworks such as United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325
suggests that there is hope for a qualitative shift in the conditions that sustain gender inequality
in regions like Africa, where two decades of armed conﬂict have created excessive inequalities.
However, the absence of meaningful change for women in many corners of the continent after
more than a decade of efforts to implement this change, and subsequent resolutions, raises funda-
mental questions about the relevance and quality of these interventions and actions.
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While there have been many policy instruments and statements from regional and global policy
actors alike intended to redress gender inequity,2 the question remains as to whether peace- and
security-related policy instruments can succeed in transforming gender inequality in Africa. The
extent to which the arena of peace and security has drawn attention to gender inequality, but
also delivered tangible outcomes, and the role of speciﬁc constituencies of actors in this process
is the focus of this article. We explore the degree of coherence between the prominent narratives
surrounding gender inequality and the approaches to addressing them. To what extent, for
example, do the policy frameworks adopted in responding to gender inequality reﬂect feminist per-
spectives that propose a transformation in existing structures and power dynamics? Is the commit-
ment and intention of those tasked with implementing these policies aligned with the agenda of
gender equality? Or do they perform the role of guardian or gatekeepers to the structures that per-
petrate gender inequality, which in turn sustains the cycles of insecurity for women?
This article identiﬁes and discusses three pillars of inﬂuence on gender and security – feminist
security analysis, civil society activism and policy decision-making. It argues that these three
pillars, individually and collectively, have made important contributions to the debate and
action on the gender and security agenda, but that they, notwithstanding their apparent interaction,
remain organically disconnected.3 We argue that their convergence has the potential to achieve
path-breaking results while their divergence makes transformation unattainable. We illustrate
this with the experiences that led to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security,
and subsequent efforts to implement this resolution in Africa. In this regard, we argue that despite
evidence of signiﬁcant efforts at the policy level, the gains realised in terms of gender equality in the
peace and security arena in Africa are negligible.
Three pillars of inﬂuence and point of convergence
Three apparent pillars of inﬂuence have driven, in part, the gender and security agenda – globally
and regionally. First is the analysis of feminists researching international relations and security
studies, which highlights the gendered nature of security.4 The second entails the activities of
civil society organisations, including women’s groups, which have demonstrated a measure of con-
sistency in advocating for gender equality in the post-Cold War period. Typically, these organis-
ations actively engage policy practitioners to promote gender-sensitive policies or their application
where such policies are in existence. The third includes a cross-section of policy actors at global,
regional and national levels, particularly those with the clout to inﬂuence or make policy decisions.
Individually, these pillars have made notable contributions to the gender and security discourse
and practice. But their convergence offers the promise of transformation – conceptually and practi-
cally – of the terrain on which gender inequality thrives. A convergence of these pillars, for example,
led to the adoption ofUNSCR1325,whichwas path-breaking at the time of its adoption inOctober
2000. UNSCR 1325 marked the ﬁrst time that the issue of gender inequality and, in particular, the
disproportionate impact of armed conﬂict on women and their gross under-representation in peace
processes, had entered the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Feminist security analysis
An examination of the trajectory of feminist security analysis reveals a relatively recent, piecemeal 
yet multi-layered engagement of feminist analysts with the subject of gender and security.
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Traditional security and strategic studies were not concerned with the experience of individuals and
as such it was difﬁcult to highlight the gendered nature of security. Security discourse, particularly
in the Cold War era, was state-centric – and understandably so. Analysis responded almost exclu-
sively to the dominant events and narratives of that era. The prevailing realist paradigm concen-
trated attention on the state and its defence. The defence of the state was in turn viewed within
the context of a bipolar world embroiled in a nuclear arms race and the restraining danger of super-
power confrontation. Little or no attention was paid to events below the level of the state. As such,
the security and safety of individuals had little room in security analysis, let alone any associated
issues of gender inequality.
In effect, Africa and the experiences of ordinary Africans were peripheral to this consideration.
African states emerged at the heart of theColdWar and inevitably constructed their security and poli-
tics to suit the demands of a bipolarworld. Immediate post-independent and successive regimes, with
very few exceptions, aligned themselves with either side of the ColdWar divide. They either leaned
toward Soviet-led communist ideology or theWestern alliance capitalist stance, even though many
of them retained membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, while African history and
politics were naturally at the core of teaching curriculums and research programmes, international
relations (including its strategic studies branch) only emerged as a prominent ﬁeld of study within
African institutions and among African analysts during the 1980s.
The idea that security might be framed to include the personal experiences of individuals – one
of the features of feminist theorising – featured little in security studies in Africa. The region had
conclusively received a top-down, Anglo-American conception of security. In any case, conceiv-
ing of security in state-centric and militaristic ways was well suited to the agenda of regimes that had
seized the advantage of a Cold War terrain to entrench themselves in power and adopt narratives
that were attractive to their superpower allies. In that dispensation, the character of African states
and, in particular, the internal conduct of regimes was far removed from the considerations of their
great power allies. The plight of hundreds of millions of citizens who were excluded from access to
resources or political participation was far from the radar of the leading powers. Not surprisingly,
gender inequality, which was itself a key feature of the entrenched patriarchal structures in these
states, was not about to leap to the fore of national and regional attention under those conditions.
To the extent that they engaged in security discourses, feminist analysts responded to the pre-
vailing global security patterns. The role and structure of the institutions dedicated to the defence of
the state and to the maintenance of the prevailing international security system provided an obvious
channel of engagement.5 Scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, V Spike Peterson and J Ann Tickner
challenged the partial representations of war proffered by (neo-)realists, contending that they essen-
tially denoted the experiences of men, and ‘that International Relations assumptions were
grounded in an increasingly unviable assertion of the state as the protector’.6 In addition, the
notion of ‘alternative defence’ articulated by Booth and Baylis,7 among others, was initially periph-
eral to global security considerations. It, however, provided an avenue and the possibility of bring-
ing to the fore security situations below the level of the state with individuals as a central focus.
Hendricks noted:
The work of feminist international relations scholars dovetailed with the general rethinking of
security in the post-Cold War context. By 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed and with it the
bipolar rivalry that dominated global security discourse for the preceding four decades. Tra-
ditional security paradigms were becoming irrelevant in explaining the apparent shift from
interstate to intra-state conﬂicts. The new security paradigm therefore focused on broadening
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the concept of security to include the referents of security (to the individual) and a widening of
the range of actors involved in the provision of security.8
The outbreak of intra-state conﬂict was inevitable in Africa, particularly in the absence of the
protection offered by superpower clients who courted and supported African governments on
the basis of their ideological leanings. ‘Rogue’ states and leaders had maintained the facade of state-
hood over the massive insecurities suffered by their people. Scholars and analysts no doubt began to
respond to these events. As they did, alternative analyses, which did not gain visibility during the
Cold War era and were previously overshadowed by military and strategic studies, began to gain
ascendency.9 Yet, as Hudson points out, analysis pursued by the ‘Copenhagen school’, epitomised
by Buzan, still drew distinctions between social security where the security concerns of speciﬁc
groups, such as women, were relegated and international security which dealt with ‘collective’
security concerns.10 This distinction draws attention to the limited ways in which the structural
factors that perpetuate gender inequality are understood, and therefore the limited ways in
which the pathways to their resolution are deﬁned.
One important school,which featured little in international security considerations during theCold
War, is that of peace studies. Thework of JohanGaltung on structural violence and notions of positive
and negative peace,11 for example, has stood the test of time – but it was far removed from security
considerations in strategic studies. Similarly, Kenneth Boulding’s analysis of stable peace as an alterna-
tive to the unstable peace generated by strategic studies through notions of nuclear deterrence were
peripheral to strategic studies and its umbrella discipline of international relations.12 With the
growing recognition of such seminal works, it became possible to think about peace and security as
intertwined agendas – as two sides of the same coin. Perhaps evenmore signiﬁcantly for security analy-
sis, critical security theory emerged prominently, challenging the traditional notions of security and
strategic studies. Itmoved away fromthe idea that the state is the central andperhaps only credible guar-
antor of security, and challenged realism’s reduction of human nature and personal experiences.
Some of the more profound indications of a paradigm shift occurred in cases where analysts that
were previously ﬁrmly associated with arguments about the correctness and/or supremacy of realist,
state-centric thinking in security analysis acknowledged the solid contribution of feminist analysis.
The link between theory and the self became acceptable, as opposed to strategic studies, which
typically focus on the state and has little room for the perspectives of people: in the words of
Booth, ‘the personal, the political and the international are a seamless web’.13
Although feminist security analysis had already begun to assume a human security tone even
before the concept was clearly articulated, it was the conduct of the largely intra-state armed con-
ﬂicts in places like the former Yugoslavia and several parts of Africa that gave some prominence to
feminist security analysis with speciﬁc focus on the gendered nature of insecurity not least the dis-
proportionate impact on women.
The armed conﬂicts witnessed in Liberia (1989–1997) and later in Bosnia (1992–1995), Sierra
Leone (1991–2002) and Somalia (1991–present) revealed the character of post-Cold War conﬂicts.
The genocide in Rwanda (1994) was the most extreme manifestation of the conﬂicts. They were
occurring within states, and warring parties freely committed gross atrocities against civilians. The
very nature and conduct of these conﬂicts decidedly shifted attention and, invariably, the security
debate to the terrain below the state. It was thus possible to discuss the security of individuals – and
within this, that of particular groups of people. By 1994, the concept of human security had made
its way to the top of the security discourse, albeit controversially. The notion that the individual
ought to be the reference point in security is a central message of the human security concept,
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which gained ascendency from the ﬁrst time it was elaborated upon in the Human Development
Report published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994.14 The
idea that individuals must achieve ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ in order to be
secure became the central tenets of the human security discourse. The importance of seeing
these two freedoms as not mutually exclusive is emphasised by scholars who argue that ensuring
economic and social justice is as important as protecting people from violence.15
Feminist scholars were quick to point out the limited way in which gender was addressed in the
human security discourse, noting that ‘collapsing femininity or masculinity into the term “human”
could conceal the gendered underpinnings of security practices’.16 Lewis drew attention to the ‘for-
mulaic and ad hoc way’ in which the human security discourse treated gender, and argued for the
need to push the boundaries of the security discourse so that it could meaningfully deal with the
insecurity in the domestic sphere.17
The subject of gender has not had as visible an impact on or dominated security analysis in the
same way as ethnicity and religion, particularly within the context of intra-state conﬂict (with the
exception of, and perhaps reduction to, a focus on rape). While gender may not always be the most
important factor if taken as a unit of analysis in security discourse, it does, however, reveal an inter-
connected web of gendered practices across all levels.18 The difﬁculty associated with gender is that
it does not operate alone and interacts with other variables, which mutate at different moments. To
manage difference requires resolving all other inequalities – to deal with one alone distorts the
reality. The essence of this article’s analysis of feminist scholarly engagement with the subject of
security is not to explain the engagement, but to show how it inﬂuenced and evolved with the
then new thinking in security studies.
There are two obvious points on which to rest the discussion of the trajectory of feminist secur-
ity analysis in Africa. The ﬁrst is the fact that a signiﬁcant amount of feminist scholarly work on
security is largely generated in the global North. Only a few African feminist scholars have
taken this as a direct area of focus. Instead, what we see is a whole range of security analysis that
is often rooted in the historical work of what women’s movements have accomplished in terms
of, for example, violence against women. African scholarship in this area is, however, increasingly
stimulated by global militarisation and its impact on the continent and ongoing security sector
reform initiatives. Africa’s own attempt to offer feminist perspectives to African affairs has produced
a small but growing collection of security analysis of direct relevance to Africa.19
However, in a continent that had been co-opted into a global security system in which the
conduct of regimes and the well-being of the millions of excluded citizens were invisible in the
global arena, feminist security analysis, despite its people-centred appeal, remained at a largely con-
ceptual level. As such, while it had a high degree of appeal at least in the academic arena, translating
it into robust policy agendas with extensive application did not occur. For any meaningful change
to happen, it required that more feminist analysts engage the space of policy and activism. This is
further discussed below.
Civil society activism
The second pillar of inﬂuence in gender and security consists of the activities of gender activists,
women’s groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have been instrumental in
drawing attention to women’s insecurity in particular contexts and facilitating relevant action.
As will be shown later, the efforts of such activist groups predate the adoption of UNSCR 1325
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and in fact facilitated its coming into being. We now look at the key factors that shaped the activism
of this pillar of inﬂuence in favour of gender equality.
Campaigns and advocacy for gender equality in the peace and security arena has a pathway that
compares with that of feminist security analysis, given that it has also been gradual and responsive to
global events and processes. Certain milestones can be identiﬁed in the advocacy for gender equality
across several decades. Four world conferences on women took place before 2000, in Mexico,
Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. It was in Beijing that a clear discussion took place about the inse-
curity faced by women in situations of armed conﬂict. Platform E, one of the 12 pillars in the
outcome document of that conference, was devoted to the impact of armed conﬂict on women.
This focus on the impact of armed conﬂict occurred at the end of the Cold War, when the
deadliness of the intra-state conﬂicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Rwanda had become
apparent. The signiﬁcant increase in atrocities against women in these and other armed conﬂicts
produced the level of engagement seen among civil society actors on the issue of violence
against women, globally. The advocacy of women’s groups in the arena of peace and security
grew by accretion, as wars in places like Bosnia and Rwanda wreaked maximum havoc and gen-
erated untold atrocities against women across generations.20
In the face of these difﬁcult conﬂicts, efforts intensiﬁed in pursuit of the objectives outlined in
the outcome document of the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, Platform for
Action.21 Annual forums such as the Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) became a con-
vening point for strategising on the issues of women affected by armed conﬂict. It was in one such
annual convening of the NGO Caucus on Women and Armed Conﬂict at the CSW that the idea
of placing the issue of women in peace and security processes on the agenda of the UNSC was
mooted.22 By 1999, there was increased momentum, as a group of NGOs led by International
Alert led a global campaign on ‘Women Building Peace: From Village Council to the Negotiating
Table’. Supported by some United Nations (UN) agencies such as the United Nations Develop-
ment Fund for Women (UNIFEM), this civil society coalition pushed for the UNSC to take up
this agenda. The Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action of May 2000 maintained this
momentum. It underscored the need to include gender dimensions in peace support operations –
not least, training, leadership and mission structure.23
Women’s organisations working in this arena have also been central to supporting peace initiat-
ives where these have emerged. Notable here are the Somali Sixth Clan, Burundi women’s con-
tribution to the Arusha talks, Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS), the Mano River Women’s Peace
Network (MARWOPNET), Women as Partners for Peace in Africa (WOPPA), the West
African Peace Network (WANEP), South African Women in Dialogue (SAWID), and individual
women such as Uganda’s Betty Bigombe’s contributions as a mediator in the protracted talks with
the Lords Resistance Army’s Joseph Kony. These are just some of the forums through which
women’s initiatives in mainstream conﬂict resolution efforts have surfaced.24 More importantly,
women’s rights organisations have continually engaged institutions relevant to the maintenance
of just peace such as the police and the judiciary through training and advocacy initiatives aimed
at reforming institutional approaches to dealing with women-speciﬁc issues.
Policy decision makers and point of convergence
The third and last pillar of inﬂuence includes the action of policy decision makers. Their actions invari-
ably close the intervention cycle in the effort to address the challenge of gender inequality in peace and
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security processes. The policy decisions made by this group of actors make it possible to pave the way
toward change. The interdependence of thinking/ideas, policy analysis and action cannot be over-
stated. The policy aftermath of this interaction is clear evidence of the convergence of these pillars.
Africa, as the continent with the majority of conﬂict and post-conﬂict countries, has been a reci-
pient of this combination of efforts, albeit in varying degrees. The second and third pillars of inﬂu-
ence in particular have been adapted in various forms in Africa. The African Union (AU), regional
economic communities and their respective member states, think tanks, NGOs and women at the
community level are engaged with advocating and adopting strategies for gender mainstreaming in
peace and security mechanisms.
Africa has been at the receiving end of global policy approaches and peacebuilding interventions
for the past two decades. Indeed this could not but be the case given the scale of humanitarian tragedy
that began to unfold when a number of African conﬂicts erupted into violence. These conﬂict situ-
ations challenged global and African institutions alike. In Africa, the Economic Community ofWest
African States (ECOWAS) – a regional organisation founded for reasons of economic integration –
was the ﬁrst to break from the straitjacket of normative frameworks such as ‘non-intervention in the
internal affairs of member states’when it intervened on humanitarian grounds in the Liberian armed
conﬂict. The UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU’s predecessor, remained
limited by their adherence to this norm for a few years. ECOWASwould later ﬁnd itself intervening
in the conﬂicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire.
Before long, the agenda of the UN was occupied in large part by a string of African conﬂicts,
although it was also dealing with conﬂict in other parts of the world, not least the former Yugoslavia
and East Timor. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’sAgenda for Peace and its sup-
plement, Another Agenda for Peace, opened the path for expanded frameworks and approaches to
peace-making and peacekeeping. This included, among other things, the notions of peacebuilding
and post-conﬂict reconstruction, which were accommodated within multi-dimensional peacekeep-
ing and peace support operations. In due course, theUNwould come to deploy peacekeeping and/or
observermissions in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone andRwanda,with varying degrees of effectiveness.
In the period since 2000 we have seen some of the manifestations of sustained action, whether
in the form of new policy frameworks or the creation of new entities and institutions to champion
the agenda of women in peace and security processes. This was the case when, in October 2000,
the issue of women and armed conﬂict made it onto the agenda of the UNSC with the adoption of
UNSCR 1325.
The coalition of civil society (including scholars) and policy actors that worked together to
facilitate the adoption of UNSCR 1325 is striking evidence of what can happen when these
pillars of inﬂuence converge. This was the case, for example, with the governments and ambassa-
dors of Bangladesh, Jamaica, Canada, the Netherlands and the UK, who put their weights behind
civil society organisations to champion the cause of women in peace and security processes at the
UN in 2000.25 This was a key action leading to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000; it
was clearly the result of the convergence of the analytical work of feminists, the activism of civil
society and the weight of policy actors.
UNSCR 1325 and the pathway to application
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 drew international attention to the linkage between gender and 
security and the need to include women in the processes of peace-making, peacekeeping and
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peacebuilding. The resolution focuses on a number of issues around the impact of armed conﬂict
on women and their role in conﬂict management and resolution processes. A core message that
runs through the resolution is the need to integrate a gender perspective into peacebuilding and
post-conﬂict reconstruction. The provisions of UNSCR 1325 are typically summed up as ‘the
3Ps’ – the protection of women, the prevention of armed conﬂict and the increased participation of
women.
Overall, UNSCR 1325 is better conceived of in practical ways – and it is by no means a panacea
to the challenges faced by women in peace and security processes. It is the result of a negotiated
process – a compromise document that had to ﬁnd common ground for all signatory states, and
not just the states that were enthusiastic about promoting the women, peace and security
agenda. As such, it could not meet the expectation that it would go deep enough to address the
gender inequalities that are deeply embedded in the discourses surrounding international security
institutions and processes, as highlighted by academics and analysts.26
Indeed, the compromising nature of UNSCR 1325 might account in part for the thinness of its
application on the ground, as discussed below – but it is difﬁcult to draw this conclusion from the
patchy data that exists at the moment. On the surface, these three pillars present a picture of a con-
certed and effective response to the issue of gender inequality. A closer examination, however,
reveals that the linkage between them is neither systematic nor deep. Mainstream security dis-
course, including debates on international security whether at global or regional level, rarely
take on board feminist security analysis. Feminist perspectives on gender and security are invariably
lost along the way and fail to gain depth in policy approaches and responses. There is no clarity as
yet as to where and how the disconnect occurs.
What is apparent, however, is that the policy frameworks developed in response to gender
inequality are easily removed from the centre stage of global security concerns. In the same
vein, gender activists are easily relegated to the periphery of global and international security con-
siderations, with an emphasis on the humanitarian nature of the challenges facing women, for
instance. Gender-related security concerns are only tangentially connected to programmatic inter-
ventions designed to implement supposedly new radical international security agendas. Even in the
few, typical exceptions such as peace processes, the ‘add-on’ nature of gender considerations and
the superﬁcial inclusion of women remain a regular feature. Similarly, gender concerns are
simply added to mainstream security programmatic interventions, as seen, for example, in the
areas of security and justice sector reform, post-conﬂict reconstruction and development.
The value of UNSCR 1325 in exploring this disconnectedness between policy and application
is that it offers a prism through which one can view the pathway from analysis to decision-making
and practical application. It might then be possible, over time, to systematically investigate this tra-
jectory in order to understand the facilitators and disablers of transformation along this pathway.
For now, what is clear is that the obvious convergence of feminist analysis, civil society activism
and action by policy decision makers which led to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 has not been
a tangible and consistent feature in its application in Africa. The efforts to apply UNSCR 1325
in Africa reveal little or no convergence between these pillars of inﬂuence.
The absence of qualitative change
Efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 are visible at several levels in the region. The ﬁrst includes UN 
peace operations in Africa, which often serve as the channel for implementation of UNSCR 1325
8
in conﬂict-affected countries. The logic of the intervening role of peace operations and by exten-
sion the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in addressing gender inequality is
easy to understand. As the leading actor for the restoration of peace in the conﬂict-affected states, it
is the local society’s ﬁrst point of contact with universal norms, principles and policies in the peace
implementation process. It is thus the actor best suited to begin the implementation of UNSCR
1325 in those settings. It can do so in a number of ways, including:
. Serving as a model by making its own internal framework and practices reﬂect the principles
of UNSCR 1325;
. Reﬂecting gender perspectives throughout its programme design and implementation; and
. Reaching out to inﬂuence communities and systems in the countries where the UN peace
mission is present through its mechanisms and staff, in particular through its gender ofﬁces.
Typically, the mandates of peace operations that came into being after the adoption of UNSCR
1325 are now explicit about the implementation of the provisions of the resolution, and UN oper-
ations have consistently included gender elements in their periodic reporting.27
It is tempting to be self-congratulatory about the attempts to implement UNSCR 1325 within
UN operations. Ideally, the concern and attention of policymakers and practitioners as well as a
readily interested and energised women’s movement should by now be directed to one issue:
how best to achieve similar results in the terrains where such peace operations are not present.
But thus far, anecdotal evidence suggests that all of the above remain an aspiration rather than a
reality. At present there are less than 10 post-conﬂict environments in Africa where the UN has
a peacekeeping presence and where the weight of its institutions and policies can be brought to
bear. In those settings, there is no real evidence that gender relations are being transformed or
that gender equality is becoming a living reality.28
Serious gaps remain in the application of UNSCR 1325 by peace operations. Indeed, peace
operations have become a microcosm of the deeper structural issues that serve as obstacles to the
achievement of gender equality. The attitudes and values exhibited by many peace operations
staff – who do not necessarily believe in or ascribe to gender equality – are part of the problem.
As such, many are content to do no more than take a technical approach in dealing with this
issue.29 This factor appears to be one of the main disablers that prevent transformation in the trans-
lation of policies such as UNSCR 1325 into meaningful change in affected societies. Invariably,
only the individual Gender Adviser or peace operation staff member with a genuine commitment
to the issue of gender equality takes the extra step to go beyond merely ‘ticking the box’ in imple-
menting gender-related policies.
We must hasten to add that while being potentially the ﬁrst point of visible and organised UN
contact with the organised parts of conﬂict-affected states and societies, actors connected to the UN
DPKO and peace missions are often not the only UN presence on the ground. Apart from their
contributions to multi-dimensional peace operations, other UN agencies – including UNWomen
(formerly UNIFEM), the UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Food Pro-
gramme and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) – are often present in conﬂict-
affected societies. While these agencies may interact with local communities in their respective
areas of work expertise, opportunities always exist to reﬂect gender perspectives in their work in
conﬂict-affected areas – and many of them often do. Indeed, agencies like the UNFPA and the
UNDP, who are not directly tasked with the application of UNSCR 1325, have taken steps to
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implement UNSCR 1325-related programmes in a number of post-conﬂict contexts. As earlier
indicated, the real challenge lies in the depth and concreteness of the application.
The application of UNSCR 1325 and related agenda by African regional 
organisations
The degree to which UNSCR 1325 has been embraced by African states and regional organisations
can be reﬂected in the state of application of regional instruments and of national action plans. In
areas without a signiﬁcant UN presence, which applies to much of Africa, altering the policy and
practice of regional actors offers a reasonable chance to inﬂuence the performance of its state
members. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) presents an ideal framework for
implementing UNSCR 1325 and building an overall gender perspective in the work of the
African Union Commission (AUC) and in the policies ratiﬁed by member states. Given that the
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) form one of the ‘building blocks’ of APSA, implement-
ing UNSCR 1325 and related policy frameworks in the RECs is vitally important for transmitting
the values and principles of the resolution.
At the level of the AU, perhaps the most visible manifestation of the internalisation of UNSCR
1325 is the ‘Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa’ (SDGEA) of 2004.30 This declara-
tion explicitly mentions UNSCR 1325 and conﬁrms the AU’s commitment to some issues relating
to women, peace and security, including gender-based violence and gender mainstreaming in
peace processes. This instrument’s articulation of the AU’s commitment to the empowerment
of women at the highest political levels will need to be matched by a willingness and ability to
apply and systematise these principles into the daily life of the organisation.
A number of RECs have also taken steps to address gender-related security issues. Two RECs
stand out in this regard – ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
ECOWAS is seeking to address gender and security issues through several platforms, such as the
ECOWAS Conﬂict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which devotes a component to ‘women,
peace and security’, and the development of a Plan of Action for this component. The Directorate
of Human Development and Gender is now in the process of implementing this Plan of Action
over a three-year period from 2013–2016.31 SADC too has taken important steps toward addres-
sing women, peace and security issues, including the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development
of 2008, in which Article 28 calls for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and the SADC gender
policy which calls for the eradication of sexual and gender-based violence and all other forms of
violence towards women and girls. These instruments have provided opportunities for SADC
and its member states to apply the principles of UNSCR 1325.
Notwithstanding these developments at the level of the AU, and within RECs such as
ECOWAS and SADC, there is still much to be done within these organisations. For
example, women are far from the 50% mark for representation within the peace and security
institutions and programmes of these organisations. The AUC has achieved better results in
the appointment of women into senior leadership positions at the level of commissioner and
directors, where there is near gender parity, but the organs and associated institutions have
not fared as well as the top decision-making structures of the AU – the Heads of State
Summit remains an overwhelmingly male sphere.32 The AU has now also appointed Bineta
Diop as the Special Envoy on Women Peace and Security and deploys gender advisors to its
missions. However, just as the AU has been reluctant to shift to multi-dimensional
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peacekeeping, so too has there been no systematic shift in its approach to gender mainstreaming
in its peace and security endeavours. Only time will tell whether the presence of the few for-
midable women now at the AU will be sufﬁcient to create the necessary behavioural shift at the
AU and its associated peace and security organs.
There have been a few AU peacekeeping and political missions in, for example, Burundi,
Comoros, Sudan and Somalia. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) marks the ﬁrst time
there was a visible incorporation of gender considerations into an AU operation through the estab-
lishment of the position of a Gender Ofﬁcer. The role of this ofﬁcer is to ensure ‘that matters of
gender are mainstreamed in AMISOM policies and to follow up with the Somalia authorities
and other actors to ensure gender mainstreaming in key policy decisions and undertakings’.33
This was replicated in the African Mission in Mali (AFISMA), but there has been little analysis
of the impact of these efforts.
In southern Africa, with its history of liberation struggles, women’s participation in the security
sector predate UNSCR 1325. The region showed promise that it might lead the way in the
achievement of gender equality and provide lessons for the rest of the continent. However,
though it has done relatively well in terms of women’s representation, the security institutions
have not sufﬁciently grappled with the thorny issues of whose security matters, how it should
be provided and what needs to be done differently to ensure greater levels of security for all.
That is, the gendered nature of norms, culture and security practices are seldom under scrutiny:
UNSCR 1325 was never intended to engage that debate.34
Application of UNSCR 1325 at the national level
The effort to apply UNSCR 1325 transcends UN DPKO, UN agencies and regional institutions.
By 2004, proposals for implementing UNSCR 1325 were being put forward. For example, in his
report to the UNSC in 2004 on the agenda of women, peace and security, the UN Secretary-
General proposed that member states take steps to implement UNSCR 1325 at the national
level.35 Gradually, the development of National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325
became a regular part of the agenda of a number of member states. National-level implementation
has tended to focus on three areas: the participation of women in peace and security decision-
making processes, the protection of women and girls, and gender training.
Currently 50 countries have approved NAPs on women, peace and security, 15 of which are
African countries. It is instructive that African countries with approved NAPs are predominantly
those that have experienced signiﬁcant armed conﬂict in all or parts of their states.
While ‘twinning’ with donor country teams may have facilitated the war-affected countries’
development of NAPs, the processes of developing these plans in the African countries concerned
have been, by and large, ‘inclusive’ and have looked at women, peace and security issues in a ‘hol-
istic’ way.36 Post-conﬂict contexts in which peacebuilding is actively undertaken still remain the
best opportunity to include gender issues in ways that are not possible in countries that have not
experienced open armed conﬂict.
However, even with these few African countries with NAPs, it is difﬁcult to observe real trans-
formation in the key areas that form the focus of NAPs. Perhaps one exception is Rwanda,
although the progress realised in the high numbers of women represented in governance insti-
tutions and processes is rooted in a range of afﬁrmative-action policies adopted by the new
post-genocide government. However, when the high representation of women in the
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Rwandan Parliament is put to the test across all security-related areas in Rwanda, this trend is not
sustained. Careful research is, however, required to see the extent to which this is the case.
Overall, across these countries, the contents of the NAPs varies signiﬁcantly and there is no
clarity about how to measure progress in the absence of monitoring frameworks or indicators.
However, it may very well be that UNSCR 1889 (2009), which calls for better data collection
and reporting, could be used for this purpose. In sum, there is no real pattern at the national
level which indicates a qualitative shift towards the introduction of gender perspectives in peace
and security matters and processes. The expectation that regional actors and member states will
be able to make a positive change in the practice of institutions and society is far from being
fulﬁlled.
Conclusion
This paper has highlighted that the adoption of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security was
enabled by the point of convergence of three pillars – feminist security analysis, civil society acti-
vism, and policy decision-making. These pillars, it argues, when working in harmony are able to
bring about meaningful change in gender equality. However, they are often disconnected and this
enables gender to be reduced to an ‘add-on’ in much of the peace and security discourse and/or to
be marginalised in global security concerns. Moreover, in the application of UNSCR 1325 in
Africa there has been little convergence between these pillars of inﬂuence.
The absence of a cohesive narrative that moves Africa towards the transformation of gender
relations in peace and security processes therefore remains glaring. UN interventions are simply
taken as part of a general process of peacebuilding; they do not often transform relationships and
institutions in-country toward gender equality. Regional organisations and national governments
have also not demonstrated an adequate commitment to a qualitative shift in gender inequality on
the ground.
The three pillars of inﬂuence discussed in this article, at least in part, offer some promise and
potential to qualitatively shift the continent toward the agenda of gender equality; but only if
they genuinely converge. The recipe for convergence appears reachable but the disabling factors
are seemingly entrenched and will require careful dismantling if the desired change is to be realised.
As the adoption of UNSCR 1325 has demonstrated, a critical factor in the convergence of these
pillars was that all three actors maintained an activist stance. Academics were numbered in the
coalition for UNSCR 1325, as were key policy actors.
Ultimately, activism is the common denominator that provides much-needed momentum
towards change. When the three pillars are pitched against each other and there is no unity of
purpose, achieving impact-making change becomes a challenge. In addition to growing scholarship
on gender and security in Africa, it is clear that academics must engage in measured activism, as
must policy practitioners with the right credentials to inﬂuence change. This has emerged as an
important factor in both policy development and application. These ingredients are a necessary
driving force behind a change-making movement for gender equality in Africa and elsewhere.
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